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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

J OURNAL of

LAW REFORM ONLINE
COMMENT

PAST ITS PRIME: WHY THE CLEAN AIR ACT IS IN NEED OF
MODIFICATION
Levi Smith*
The Clean Air Act (CAA) 1 is the primary federal statute
regulating the emission of air pollutants. First enacted in 1970,
the CAA requires, inter alia, the federal government to establish
air quality goals 2 and states to develop implementation plans to
achieve those goals. 3 The most stringent requirements of
the CAA are imposed on “new” or “modified” sources of pollution,
such as sulfur dioxide, nitrous oxides, and particulate
matter. 4 Sources that were operating when the CAA was enacted
are mostly exempt from regulation under the Act. 5 Because of the
substantial costs associated with the CAA standards, there is an
incentive for existing sources to stay in operation instead of
modifying existing or opening new facilities. This subverts the
goals of the CAA because the most inefficient and polluting
sources stay in operation rather than being replaced with newer,
cleaner plants and new pollution control technologies. This
Comment argues for federal regulation of existing sources of
pollution under the CAA and suggests ways by which the federal
government could encourage investment in newer and cleaner
industrial sources.

*
J.D. Candidate, December 2013, University of Michigan Law School.
1.
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006).
2.
Id. § 7409.
3.
Id. § 7410.
4.
Id. § 7411 (“Standards of performance for new stationary sources”); see
also Jonathan Remy Nash &Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental
Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1677, 1678
(2007) (“Congress decided to subject new sources of air pollution to stringent pollution
control standards.”).
5.
Nash & Revesz, supra note 4, at 1678 (citations omitted) (“[The CAA]
‘grandfathered’ preexisting sources, leaving them free of federal regulation. In the ensuing
decade … statutory and regulatory development made clear that a ‘modification’ of a
grandfathered plant that increased the plant’s pollution emissions would subject it to the
same federal standards applied to ‘new sources.’”).
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The CAA imposes both technology-based standards on
individual sources of air pollution 6 and national, uniform ambient
air quality standards. 7 States must administer a regulatory
program that achieves the required ambient air quality standards
through the use of pollution control technology.8 Pollution
control can be quite expensive for sources of air pollution. For
example, in 2000, the direct compliance costs of the CAA were
estimated to be around $20 billion for all regulated sources
combined. 9 However, these standards only apply to “new” or
“modified” sources of pollution.10 New sources are those built after
the CAA was enacted. 11 Modified sources are those that were in
existence at the time the CAA was enacted but that have
undergone a “physical change or change in method of operation”
resulting in an increase in “the amount of any air pollutant
previously emitted by [the] source or results in the emission of any
air pollutant not previously emitted.” 12 Unmodified existing
sources are exempt from regulation under the CAA.
The regulatory gap between new or modified sources and
existing sources has led to the “Old Plant Effect,” where
“[d]ifferent regulatory standards for old and new plants distort the
economic analysis that existing plant owners undertake when
deciding whether to modernize or replace a plant.” 13 The strict
standards imposed by the CAA make it expensive to modify or
replace a plant.14 It is less expensive to keep an older, unmodified
plant in operation because air quality standards for these plants
are not nearly as strict. 15 Thus, so long as existing plants remain in
operation, the goals of the CAA remain out of reach.
The Old Plant Effect and the lack of regulation of existing
sources can be explained by erroneous congressional assumptions
during the CAA’s passage. Legislators assumed that most existing
6.

42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006).

Id. § 7409.
Id. § 7410.
See U.S. ENVTL. & PROT. AGENCY OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, THE BENEFITS AND
COSTS OF THE C LEAN AIR ACT FROM 1990 TO 2020, 3–7 (2011), available at http://www.epa.go
7.
8.
9.

v/oar/sect812/feb11/fullreport.pdf.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006).
11. Id. § 7411(a)(2).
12. Id. § 7411(a)(4).
13. Nash & Revesz, supra note 4, at 1708
14. Id.
15. Id.
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sources had a useful economic life of thirty to forty years,
meaning most existing sources would be transitioned to newer
sources subject to federal regulation in short order. 16 This proved
not to be the case. The economic realities of complying with
the CAA incentivized plant owners to keep existing plants in
operation far beyond the date they were projected to remain
useful, thus avoiding the CAA regulatory regime. 17
To achieve the goals of the CAA, existing sources need to be
brought into the regulatory fold. Congress should amend
the CAA to impose technology-based emission standards on
existing sources, standards which should be imposed
incrementally rather than immediately. This approach will
prevent imposing large costs on facilities, which could potentially
be passed onto consumers in forms of higher prices for their
goods. 18 An incremental regime has the benefit of allowing
sources to spread the costs of compliance over time but sacrifices
the quick reduction in emissions that full compliance offers.
While the question of approach is ultimately one for the
legislature and should be answered based on the relative costs of
compliance and burdens on industry associated with the different
regimes, the assumption that old sources would be replaced by
new sources has simply not proven true. Existing sources need to
be regulated or the goals of the CAA will not be reached, at the
expense of the public health and welfare.
Existing source owners will resist legislation requiring old
sources to be modified or replaced because this transition would
be costly and may in some instances force plants to shut down. To
counter and temper this resistance, the federal government needs
to encourage investment in new plants by reducing the financial
cost of compliance. Financial burden is the cause of the Old Plant
Effect and will continue to be a sticking point for meaningful

16. Id. at 1682
17. RICHARD L. REVESZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 429 (Robert C. Clark et al.
eds., 2nd ed. 2012) (“[T]he grandfathering of existing sources in the CAA has provided an
incentive to continue running existing facilities in order to avoid triggering the expensive
and time-consuming requirements for new and modified facilities.”).
18. The Government Accountability Office found that imposing new regulations on
existing coal-fired power plants “would likely increase electricity prices in some
regions.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO–12–635, EPA REGULATIONS AND
ELECTRICITY: BETTER MONITORING BY AGENCIES COULD STRENGTHEN EFFORTS TO ADDRESS
POTENTIAL C HALLENGES 38 (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12–635.
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reform. 19 Therefore, reducing costs should be a major goal of
remedial legislation. For instance, Congress could offer tax credits
for investment in pollution control technology or subsidize this
investment, which would be similar to current subsidies for
“green” energy initiatives. 20 Congress could also impose a tax on
fuel
sources
that
would
be
used
to
subsidize
investment. 21 Additionally, the federal government could offer
low-interest loans to sources, which would allow them to finance
pollution control technologies for years to come. Finally, the
option to force sources into compliance exists through the broad
powers of Congress. The viability of this option depends on the
contemporary political winds and how important the CAA’s goals
are to the legislature. In any event, achieving the goals of
the CAA by regulating existing sources is imperative. The federal
government needs to explore creative and cooperative policies to
encourage transition to cleaner sources as soon as possible.

19. Nash & Revesz, supra note 4, at 1711 (explaining that environmental compliance
costs influence source owners’ choices regarding existing and new sources).
20. See, e.g., Qualifying Advanced Energy Project Credit, 26 U.S.C. § 48C (2006).
21. See, e.g., Mona Hymel, The United States’ Experience With Energy-Based Tax
Incentives: The Evidence Supporting Tax Incentives for Renewable Energy, 38 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 43 (2006) (arguing, generally, that the United States has historically used the tax code
to influence energy policy and choices).

